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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff-Appellee Lisa Tapp (“Tapp”), seeks to avoid this Court’s review of Rule
9(c)’s straightforward language that when a party “alleg[es] fraud … a party must state
with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud….” Utah R. Civ. P. 9(c). Tapp
does so by making four incorrect arguments.
First, Tapp ignores Rule 9(c)’s plain language and the many cases from Utah and
elsewhere that uniformly hold Rule 9 applies to fraud allegations offered to extend a
limitations period. Second, Tapp mischaracterizes the allegations against Intermountain
as being the same as those made against Dr. Sorensen (including Dr. Sorensen “created
medical charts that falsely reflected [conditions] patients had suffered from” (see T.R.128
(¶ 28), 134-35 (¶¶ 43-44))1 or the same as those against St. Mark’s (it advertised Dr.
Sorensen’s services). Third, Tapp seeks an unappealed reversal of substantive rulings by
the district court, including that § 78B-3-404(2)(b)’s “affirmatively acted to fraudulently
conceal” language is not satisfied by silence (see T.R.312,753-56), and that § 78B-3404(2)(a)’s “foreign object” provision is not applicable. See T.R.309-10. Finally, Tapp
argues that fairness and public policy favor pursuing fraud discovery when no fraud is
alleged.
Tapp’s arguments lack merit. Cases uniformly hold that a fraudulent concealment
defense to a facially untimely claim must be pled with particularity under Rule 9(c).

1

Intermountain adopts Tapp’s citation format for the Tapp Record (“T.R.”).
1

Tapp cites no case supportive of her argument that Rule 9(c) applies only to “affirmative
claims” and “affirmative defenses,” not to a fraud defense to an affirmative defense.
Second, Tapp cannot ignore that her First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), as the
district court held, alleges “IHC was not involved in any alleged fraud from the outset;
instead, plaintiff claims that at some point in time, IHC learned about Dr. Sorensen’s
malfeasance and thus had a duty to alert plaintiff.” T.R.753-56. Consequently, the
district court dismissed Tapp’s fraud and conspiracy claims against Intermountain under
Rule 9(c). T.R.734,736-37.
Third, to seek affirmation of the district court’s denial of Intermountain’s motion
to dismiss based upon alternative arguments, including that silence constitutes
“affirmative” concealment, or that a ”foreign object” exception applies, Tapp was
required to appeal the district court’s adverse rulings on these issues. See T.R.309-10,
312, 753-56; State v. Coble, 2010 UT App 98, ¶ 11, 232 P.3d 538.
Finally, this Court should reject Tapp’s argument that fraud discovery should
proceed against a party that Tapp admits did not participate in fraud because it never
interacted with her and therefore did not contribute to her delayed filing. Tapp has never
articulated what fraud she hopes to “discover,” and her interpretation of Utah Code §
78B-3-404(2)(b) would allow fraud discovery in every case where a plaintiff alleges it
should have been told of alleged malpractice. Such a ruling would eviscerate the repose
statute and cannot be squared with the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act’s (“UHMA”)
explicitly stated public policy.

2

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Tapp incorrectly states that “the hospitals … fraudulently concealed [Dr.
Sorensen’s] misconduct by telling patients that the heart procedures were necessary,” Br.
5 (citing T.R.124–27), and that the “hospitals created false medical records to make the
heart procedures appear to be medically necessary.” E.g., Br. 10 (emphasis added)
(citing T.R.128). Tapp does not make these allegations against Intermountain. She has
not alleged any interaction with Intermountain, let alone that it “told” her that her “heart
procedure [was] necessary.” Br. 5. Further, the FAC describes only instances of Dr.
Sorensen allegedly falsifying medical records and making misstatements. See T.R.128
(¶¶27-28),134 (¶¶43-44). As the district court correctly held, Tapp’s FAC contains no
allegation of an “affirmative act of fraud by [Intermountain].” T.R.754.2 Plaintiff’s only
allegation of “fraudulent concealment” by Intermountain is a legal conclusion based on
silence. T.R.130–132(¶¶ 33-35), 145(¶¶ 103-105).

2

See also T.R.736 (“The allegations of [Intermountain’s] fraud in inducing Ms. Tapp to
have surgery are non-existent.”). In the FAC ¶ 25 Tapp alleges: “Sorensen and IHC
created false statements and documents to conceal … Sorensen[‘s] medically unnecessary
closures.” T.R.128. As the district court correctly found, however, this allegation is a
mere conclusion that is inconsistent with Tapp’s allegations that only Dr. Sorensen
falsified his records. T.R.736. The lumping of Intermountain with Dr. Sorensen in FAC
¶ 25 does not meet Rule 8 standards, let alone Rule 9(c). See America West Bank
Members LC v. State, 2104 UT 4, ¶ 7, 342 P.3d 224 (conclusions inconsistent with facts
are not accepted under Rules 8 and 12(b)(6)); Gray v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp., 672 F.3d
909, 921, n.9 (10th Cir. 2012) (Rule 8 is not met by allegations that fail to isolate the
allegedly unlawful acts of each defendant). Tapp’s assertion that Intermountain is legally
accountable for Dr. Sorensen’s separate medical records fails as a matter of law as the
district court correctly ruled. T.R.128 (¶¶27-28),134(¶¶43-44),734,736-37,753-56.
3

Tapp also overstates the scope of her fraud allegations against Dr. Sorensen.
While the district judge held that Tapp adequately pled a fraud by Dr. Sorensen in
inducing Tapp to have a PFO closure, the district court recognized no subsequent
concealment fraud is pled against anyone. T.R.311-12 (“the FAC does not allege any
specific facts of any later fraudulent concealment”) (citing FAC ¶¶ 79-84 (T.R.142));
T.R.751-52 (“Dr. Sorensen engaged in fraudulent conduct … by misrepresenting the need
and medical efficacy of the surgery … followed by years of perpetuating that falsehood
by silence.”).3
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS TAPP’S FAC
AS TO INTERMOUNTAIN PURSUANT TO RULES 12(b)(6) AND 9(c).
The parties agree the “inclusion of dates in [a] complaint indicating that an action

is untimely renders it subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim … under Rule
12(b)(6).” Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, ¶ 8, 53 P.3d 947; Br.
37. The parties further agree that Tapp alleges her closure occurred in 2008, and that she

3

Tapp’s failure to address the absence of an alleged concealment fraud is significant.
Tapp never addresses Allred v. Allred, 2008 UT 337, ¶ 37, 183 P.3d 337, wherein this
Court held that allegations of a prior fraud without a “further showing that the defendant
also concealed it from the plaintiff” are insufficient to toll. Tapp’s only response to
Intermountain’s Opening Brief (“Opening”) at 19-20 and Sorensen’s Opening Brief
(“Sorensen Br.”) at 47-53 on this issue is to declare she is “not require[d] [to] explain[]
how [defendants] took affirmative steps to conceal.” Tapp Brief (“Br.”) at 30. Tapp also
does not address the many medical negligence cases cited on appeal and below that hold
a separate concealment fraud is required. Opening at 19-20; Sorensen Br. at 47-53;
T.R.176, 303,366-67, 585-87, 838. Tapp apparently believes the district court’s incorrect
legal ruling finding Allred inapplicable need not be addressed. T.R.311. But once Allred
is properly applied to § 78B-3-404(2)(b), Tapp has not alleged subsequent fraudulent
concealment by anyone. T.R.311-12, 751-52.
4

filed suit nearly five years after the UHMA’s four-year repose period expired. The
parties diverge, however, regarding how the UHMA’s affirmative concealment fraud
exception, Utah Code § 78B-3-404(2)(b), operates in conjunction with Rules 12(b)(6)
and 9(c).
According to Tapp, the exception is triggered—and the statute of repose erased at
the pleading stage—upon a naked allegation of “fraudulent concealment” that need not be
“pled with particularity” and need not “describe how the [particular] health care provider
fraudulently concealed the misconduct.” Br. 35, 42. Tapp further argues that a
provider’s “decision to remain silent” triggers the exception. Br. 33. Under Tapp’s
reading, merely mentioning the words “fraudulent concealment” opens the door to
“concealment” discovery and eliminates the repose period in all cases except where a
provider has previously notified the patient that malpractice occurred. See Br. 35. Under
this reading, any provider that disputes liability, i.e., providers who have not informed
patients of malpractice, will be subject to a fraudulent non-disclosure exception.
The Legislature, however, did not intend to permit malpractice plaintiffs to so
easily dispense with § 78B-3-404(2)(b)’s carefully-crafted repose provision. Tapp’s
suggested interpretation is contrary to the language of the exception itself, this Court’s
applications of it, and, as Tapp admits, every court that has evaluated whether fraudulent
concealment allegations must meet Rule 9, including cases from five Federal Circuits
(including the Tenth Circuit). See Br. at 49, n.5.

5

Intermountain responds to Tapp’s arguments below, and explains why the district
court erred in failing to dismiss Tapp’s facially untimely claims against Intermountain
pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(c).
A.

Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(c) Require Dismissal Against Intermountain.

The parties substantively agree that Rule 12(b)(6) applies to a facially untimely
complaint. Tapp correctly states that “inclusion of dates in [a] complaint indicating that
an action is untimely renders it subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim … under
Rule 12(b)(6).” Tucker, 2002 UT 54, ¶ 8. Tapp alleges her PFO closure occurred in
2008, nearly nine years before she sued in 2017. T.R.132–37. Consequently, Rules 9
and 12(b)(6) and the UHMA impose a burden on Tapp to plead around the facial
untimeliness alleged in the FAC in one way: by “alleg[ing]”—as the statutory exception
itself requires—that the health care provider “affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal”
that provider’s misconduct. Utah Code § 78B-3-404(2)(b). Only when such facts are
sufficiently “alleged” does the exception preclude Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of a facially
stale claim.
Tapp acknowledges that “[t]he [UHMA] requires … an allegation of fraudulent
concealment” to avoid dismissal. Br. 35 (emphasis added). In other words, unlike the
district court, Tapp now agrees with Intermountain that she has a burden to allege
fraudulent concealment to avoid Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal under § 78B-3-404(2)(b).
Contra T.R.734–35 (district court “[n]one of [Intermountain’s] cases stand for the
proposition that a plaintiff in the first instance has the obligation to state facts necessary
to defeat a statute of limitations defense at all, let alone with a degree of particularity”).
6

Indeed, this proposition is settled, and finds support in Tucker, 2002 UT 54, ¶ 9,
Russell Packard Devel., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ¶ 8, 108 P.3d 741, Young Resources
Ltd. Partnership v. Promontory Landfill LLC, 2018 UT App 99, 2018 WL 2470958, and
what appears to be uniform Federal Circuit treatment. See Opening at 12, n.14.
Tapp nonetheless argues a mere legal conclusion suffices to jump over the repose
statute and force discovery into the possibility of concealment fraud by a party against
whom no fraud allegation is made. Tapp advocates for this position by repeatedly
arguing that Intermountain should have sought summary judgment. E.g., Br. 38. But
public policy in Utah and elsewhere is to allow discovery regarding fraud only after fraud
has been properly alleged, and thus framed the scope of discovery. See Shah v.
Intermountain Healthcare, Inc., 2013 UT App 261, ¶ 12, 314 P.3d 1079 (“a plaintiff
alleging fraud must know what his claim is when he files it” and a fraud claim should
“seek to redress … a wrong, not … find one”) (quoting Farlow v. Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 990 (10th Cir. 1992) and Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602,
607-08 (2nd Cir. 1972)); Fid. Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 2015 UT App 19, ¶ 11,
344 P.3d 156 (“Plaintiff’s assertion that they will ‘not know until discovery’ the specific
misrepresentations made is precisely what Rule 9(b) seeks to prevent”). Additionally, in
Roth v. Pedersen, 2009 UT App 313, 2009 WL 3490974 *2-3, as detailed below, the
court held that Rule 12 is a proper procedural vehicle to seek dismissal of fraudulent
concealment allegations under § 78B-3-404(2)(b) that are based exclusively on a party’s
silence.

7

Ultimately, Tapp’s argument that a motion to dismiss was “procedurally
unavailable” (Br. 35) is not based on a disagreement over Rule 12(b)(6), but over whether
§ 78B-3-404(2)(b) can be invoked by a mere legal conclusion that admittedly does not
meet Rule 9(c)’s standards. However, as explained below, Rule 9(c) applies to every
allegation of fraud, including those made under § 78B-3-404(2)(b).
B.

Rule 9(c) Governs Tapp’s § 78B-3-404(2)(b) Allegations.

Rule 9(c) contains no exception based upon the reason a party alleges “fraud.”
Rather, 9(c) states that “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Utah R. Civ. P. 9(c)
(emphasis added). This Court and it appears every court that has addressed Rule 9’s
application to allegations that a fraud excuses facial untimeliness has held that Rule 9
applies.
In Chapman v. Primary Children’s Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1989), this Court
dismissed a negligence claim against one physician (Dr. Myer) for failure to plead
fraudulent concealment with particularity under § 78B-3-404(2)(b). See id. at 1185–86.
This Court’s application of Rule 9(c) to § 78B-3-404(2)(b) has been applied by Utah
courts since, consistent with the Federal Circuits’ treatment of common law fraudulent
concealment allegations that plead a defense to facial untimeliness. See, e.g., Roth v.
Pedersen, 2009 UT App 313, 2009 WL 3490974, at *3–4; Opening Br. 19 n.22 (citing
federal authorities).
Tapp nevertheless argues that Rule 9(c) has no application to “allegations [of
fraud] that anticipate affirmative defenses” because “the statute governs what must be
8

alleged.” Br. 41–42; T.R.734. But this proposition is unsupported and it contradicts Rule
1 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Utah R. Civ. P. 1 (“[t]hese rules govern
the procedure … in all actions of a civil nature … and in all statutory proceedings….”).
Tapp offers no case that makes an exception to Rule 9’s particularity requirement,
even in the context of a defense to an affirmative defense. Br. 40–49. This contrasts with
the wealth of authority Intermountain offers, including this Court’s recognition that Rule
9 applies to allegations of fraud made for any purpose. See Opening Br. 15–19 (citing
Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 972 (Utah 1982) (“The purpose of [Rule
9(c)] dictates that it reach all circumstances where the pleader alleges … deceptions
covered by the term ‘fraud’ in its broadest dimension.” (emphasis added)). Tapp fails to
distinguish Williams or the uniform federal cases that apply Rule 9 to allegations of
fraudulent concealment as an exception (i.e. “defense”) to an affirmative defense of facial
untimeliness.4
1.

Tapp Does Not Distinguish On-Point Authority Applying Rule 9(c).

Intermountain previously cited three Utah cases, two from this Court, that apply
Rule 9(c)’s particularity requirement to fraud allegations that seek to avoid an affirmative
defense. In other words, a “defense” to an “affirmative defense.” Tapp offers no
contrary authority but instead attempts—unsuccessfully—to distinguish these Utah cases.

4

Tapp concedes “a few jurisdictions” adhere to the rule Intermountain advocates, Br. 18,
but tellingly she fails to identify a jurisdiction that does not adhere to this commonsense
application.
9

a.

Chapman.

In Chapman, this Court held that “the requirement of Rule 9(b) had been met” as
to concealment allegations under § 78B-3-404(2)(b) against certain hospital defendants,
but not as to another defendant, Dr. Myer. Chapman, 784 P.2d at 1185–86. Tapp
wrongly contends that the same concealment allegations found sufficient as to the
hospital defendants were found insufficient for purposes of the plaintiffs’ cause of action
for fraudulent concealment against Dr. Myer, meaning “rule 9(c) applies to independent
causes of action but not to the fraudulent concealment exception.” Br. 46–47. That is not
what this Court held.
Chapman’s fraud analysis is found exclusively within the context of deciding “the
question of whether the Chapmans’ lawsuit was [timely] filed … under the [UHMA].”
Chapman, 784 P.2d at 1184, 1183. The district court determined it was untimely,
compelling dismissal in its entirety. Id. This Court held that the concealment allegations
against the hospital defendants were “sufficiently clear and specific … to support our
conclusion that the requirement of Rule 9(b) has been met,” triggering an exception. Id.
at 1185. This Court expressly noted that the hospital defendants’ “pleadings and
affidavits” made it a “close call whether … the Chapmans were sufficiently alerted to the
possibility of medical malpractice … to start the statute of limitations running.” Id.
(emphasis added).

10

This Court then found different allegations against Dr. Myer insufficient under
Rule 9(b)5 to save a negligence claim against Dr. Myer from the repose period. Id. at
1186, 1184. Nowhere did this Court indicate that a fraudulent concealment cause of
action was alleged against Dr. Myer, nor would it have made sense to affirm dismissal of
a negligence claim against Dr. Myer based on inadequate concealment allegations in a
separate affirmative claim. In other words, Tapp’s attempted distinction between
fraudulent concealment “claims” and tolling allegations makes no sense in context. This
Court plainly applied Rule 9 to the Chapmans’ concealment allegations under § 78B-3404(2)(b), as the district court should have done here, and dismissed claims against one
defendant but not against others where the narrow statutory exception was adequately
pled under Rule 9.
b.

Norton.

Tapp next attempts to distinguish this Court’s holding in Norton v. Blackham that
a plaintiff’s attempt to argue fraud to defeat the affirmative defense of release “was not
properly pleaded” under Rule 9. 669 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1983). The trial court granted
summary judgment “on the ground that the parties had entered into an agreement
releasing the defendant.” Id. at 858.6 On appeal, the plaintiff argued “there are factual
issues as to whether the defendant obtained the release by fraud or misrepresentation.”

5

Under the prior version of Utah R. Civ. P. 9, the heightened pleading standard was
contained in subsection (b).
6
Tapp emphasizes that “Norton is a summary judgment case.” Br. 36 (emphasis in
original). Intermountain agrees, but it cites Norton for its application of Rule 9, not Rule
12(b)(6).
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Id. This Court rejected that argument, holding “[f]irst the issue was not properly
pleaded” under Rule 9. Id.
The Court secondarily found that “the plaintiff’s assertion of fraud or
misrepresentation in her affidavit in opposition to summary judgment is legally
insufficient.” Id. Tapp argues the prior Rule 9 ruling is dicta because the judgment was
affirmed “on the basis that the plaintiff’s evidence of fraud was legally insufficient.” Br.
36 (emphasis in original). But nothing in this Court’s discussion of an affidavit supplants
the holding that fraud must be pled but “was not properly pleaded” under Rule 9. Id. at
858. Consistent with Chapman’s discussion of Dr. Myer, this Court again applied Rule 9
to a defense to an affirmative defense. As set forth below, that outcome is logical
because Rule 9 expressly applies to any fraud allegation, and a defense to an affirmative
defense is nonetheless a defense.
c.

Roth.

In Roth v. Pedersen, the Utah Court of Appeals held—citing Chapman—that the
plaintiff’s failure to allege that he consulted with a defendant about prior medical care
meant he could not have been affirmatively misled into a delayed filing. 2009 UT App
313, 2009 WL 3490974, at *3–4. A naked allegation of “fraudulent concealment” based
on silence was found insufficient as a matter of law to meet “particularity as required by
rule 9(b).” Id.
Tapp responds that the discussion of Rule 9 is dicta because the court found
Roth’s claim to be untimely under the two-year statute of limitations, and the decision
“has no precedential value,” and “is inconsistent with the opinions from this court.” Br.
12

49. The foregoing discussion of Chapman, however, demonstrates that Roth correctly
applied Rule 9(c) and Chapman to legally insufficient allegations of fraudulent
concealment under § 78B-3-404(2)(b).
Moreover, Tapp’s argument that Roth’s holding under Rule 9(b) is “dicta” is
incorrect and inconsistent with Tapp’s argument that § 78B-3-404(2)(b) is an “exception”
to the limitation periods found in § 78B-3-404(1). Br. 16. It is precisely because the
plaintiff’s claims were untimely under § 78B-3-404(1), including under both the
limitation and repose periods, that the court was required to address and determine
whether an exception within § 78B-3-404(2)(b) was adequately pled under Rule 9. 2009
UT App 313, *2-3 (May 2004 alleged failure in care and August 2008 filing).7
It is also important to consider that Roth’s allegations of “affirmative[] act[ion] to
fraudulently conceal” based on silence are strikingly similar to Tapp’s. Id. *3. The court
found such allegations inadequate as a matter of law under Rule 12(c). Id. *2. Tapp
attempted to distinguish Roth below by incorrectly arguing (as she now incorrectly argues
as to Chapman) that the case involved “fraudulent concealment claims,” not a possible
exception under § 78B-3-404(2)(b). T.R.532. Intermountain responded by
demonstrating that Roth’s legal analysis is of the sufficiency of silence allegations under
§ 78B-3-404(2)(b), not an affirmative claim. 2009 UT App 313, *3. To eliminate any
doubt on this critical point, Intermountain provided to the district court the appeal briefs
in Roth. T.R.393-466.

7

See also Roth v. Joseph, 2010 UT App 332, ¶ 3, 244 P.3d 391 (describing care facts).
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Roth thus held that a health care provider’s alleged silence can never legally
satisfy § 78B-3-404(2)(b) “[e]ven assuming that a fiduciary duty to reveal this
information existed.” 2009 UT App 313, *3. It is because Roth is so directly on point
that Tapp goes to great lengths to dismiss this critically illuminating case.
C.

Tapp’s Other Arguments Regarding Rule 9(c) Lack Merit.

Tapp’s only substantive argument regarding Rule 9(c) is based on other rules
(Rules 8 and 9(i)), and a plea that the non-application of Rule 9(c) “makes sense” because
“the patient has not yet discovered the full details of the fraud.” See Br. 42. Neither
argument has merit.
1.

Rules 8 and 9(i) Do Not Limit the Requirements of Rule 9(c).

Tapp seeks to read into Rule 9(c) an unstated exception through other rules, none
of which modify Rule 9(c)’s unambiguous language. Tapp argues “rule 8 describes what
must be alleged in pleadings—claims, defenses to claims, and affirmative defenses,” and
these are the only “pleadings” to which Rule 9(c) applies. See Br. 42. Tapp, however,
cites no authority and she does not square her argument with the myriad cases
Intermountain cites applying Rule 9(c) to complaints and answers, both of which can
contain “allegations” and “defenses.” See Opening 19, n.22.
Tapp admits that “the 9(c) [particularity] requirement applies to the defenses
asserted in a defendant’s answer” (Br. at 45) (citing Utah cases) but she argues
particularity does not apply to a “defensive allegation” to an “affirmative defense.” Rules
8 and 9, however, expressly apply to “defenses” asserted in any “pleading” (complaint or
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answer), and an exception to a facially pled affirmative defense is just as much a
“defense” as a defense to a “claim.”
The same goes for Tapp’s argument that Rule 9(i) provides that “a statute of
limitation defense ‘may be alleged generally,’” and “[i]t is difficult to understand why the
burden would be greater in a complaint responding to this defense before it is raised.”
Br. 41 (quoting Rule 9(i)). This non-sequitur has been rejected by Utah courts applying
Rule 9(c) to fraud allegations offered as defenses to affirmative defenses. Chapman, 784
P.2d at 1185-87; Norton, 669 P.2d at 858; Roth, 2009 UT App 313, *3. Moreover,
Tapp’s burden is the result of the UHMA’s requirement that Tapp “allege[]” affirmative
fraudulent concealment before pursuing a facially untimely claim. Utah Code § 78B-3404(2)(b).
2.

Rule 9(c) Requires More than a Legal Conclusion.

Tapp argues that Rule 9(c) shouldn’t apply “at the pleading stage, when the patient
has not yet discovered the full details of the fraud.” Br. 42. This argument is again at
odds with Utah law and public policy. Rule 9(c) does not require a plaintiff to plead the
“full details” of fraud, nor has Intermountain argued as much.8 Rather, Tapp was
required to allege that Intermountain engaged in some “affirmative[] act[] to
fraudulently conceal” its alleged misconduct. Utah Code § 78B-3-404(2)(b).

8

Tapp’s effort to ride the coattails of a Rule 9 ruling in the qui tam lawsuit is
unpersuasive. The central issues in that case were falsity (judged subjectively and/or
objectively) and medical necessity and there was no dispute that interactions occurred
between Intermountain and Medicaid payors. Here, Tapp alleges no interaction, yet she
alleges “fraud.”
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Tapp, however, has not attempted to allege fraudulent conduct by Intermountain
because she knows she never interacted with Intermountain, and she never relied on
anything Intermountain said or did in delaying her filing. See, e.g., T.R.753 (“IHC was
not involved in any alleged fraud from the outset; instead [Tapp] claims that at some
point later in time, IHC … had a duty to alert her”).
Tapp’s desire, stated on appeal, to conduct “fraudulent concealment” discovery is
also an argument of convenience. She knows she did not rely upon Intermountain in
waiting almost nine years to file. Instead, Tapp, and approximately a thousand other
plaintiffs seek a legal ruling that by putting the words “fraudulent concealment” into a
complaint they are thereby granted a procedural pass to pursue claims where the plaintiff
knows she will never discover an “affirmative[] act[] to fraudulently conceal” by
Intermountain. Utah Code § 78B-3-404(2)(b).
Moreover, the refuge Tapp seeks in arguing she has yet to discover “the full
details of the fraud” is opposite public policy. Section 78B-3-404(2)(b) applies only to
affirmative acts of concealment by a particular health care provider—i.e., fraudulent
interactions—of which a patient has knowledge. Id. Additionally, Utah courts reject
pleas to overlook deficient fraud allegations until “after discovery.” Br. 43. As stated in
Worthington, “Plaintiffs’ assertion that they will ‘not know until discovery’ the specific[s
of the fraud] is precisely what Rule 9(b) seeks to prevent.” 2015 UT App 19, ¶ 11.
In short, Tapp’s argument that Rule 9(c) has no application to “allegations related
to exceptions to affirmative defenses,” Br. 42, amounts to a request to rewrite Rule 9(c)

16

and important Utah law and policy. The Court should decline this invitation and reverse
the district court’s failure to apply Rule 9(c).
D.

Section 78B-3-404(2)(b) Applies When Particular Providers
“Affirmatively Acted to Fraudulently Conceal” Misconduct.

In claiming she has satisfied Rule 9(c), Tapp argues Intermountain’s “choice to
remain silent” constitutes an “affirmative act.” See Br. 30. Tapp’s position is premised
on the argument that when providers have “actual knowledge” of misconduct, this
knowledge imposes a “duty to disclose,” after which silence amounts to an “affirmation.”
Br. 32 (quoting Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 333 (Utah 1997)).9
Missing from Tapp’s argument is any meaningful discussion of the UHMA’s plain
language, authority supporting the proposition that a hospital owes a “duty to disclose” to
a physician’s patient that his or her prescribed procedure is unnecessary, or the practical
implications of changing a hospital’s role in the patient’s care. Tapp’s argument was also
expressly rejected by the district judge and not appealed:
The Court assumes that the legislature intended the term “affirmative” to
have meaning and the Court must interpret the statute to give that term
vitality. [Tapp’s] asserted interpretation would violate that rule of
construction. [Tapp] cannot rely on [Intermountain’s] silence alone in
seeking an exception … she must show “affirmative acts” by
[Intermountain].

9

Tapp’s reliance on Jensen is misplaced because this Court did not address § 78B-3404(2)(b) and the repose period had not expired. Jensen also involved the defendant’s
affirmative fraudulent act of leading the plaintiff to obtain counsel who had a relationship
with the defendant. Id. at 329. Further, Jensen’s discussion of common law fraudulent
concealment has since been ruled to have no application to statutory discovery rules.
Russell Packard Dev., Inc., 2005 UT 14, ¶ 25; In re Hoopiiaina, 2006 UT 53, ¶ 35, 144
P.3d 1129. The district court correctly recognized that Jensen does not support reading §
78B-3-404(2)(b) to allow “concealment by silence.” T.R.312,754-55.
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T.R.312 (citations omitted). Having foregone her “own interlocutory appeal or crossappeal,” Tapp cannot raise this issue now. Coble, 2010 UT App 98, ¶ 11. Nonetheless,
as addressed below, Tapp’s position that silence equals affirmative fraud is incorrect.
1.

Tapp’s Reading Writes the Words “Affirmatively Acted” Out of the
Statute.

“The best evidence of the legislature’s intent is ‘the plain language of the statute
itself,’” and thus, this Court assumes “that the legislature use[s] each term advisedly
according to its ordinary and usually accepted meaning.” Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ
Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14, 267 P.3d 863 (quoting State v. Miller, 2008 UT 61, ¶
18, 193 P.3d 92 and Hutter v. Dig–It, Inc., 2009 UT 69, ¶ 32, 219 P.3d 918).
Additionally, this Court “presume[s] that the expression of one [term] should be
interpreted as the exclusion of another,” and that “all omissions [are] purposeful.” Id.
Interpretation of § 78B-3-404(2)(b) begins and ends with plain language. A
facially untimely claim is potentially excused from the repose period only where it is
“alleged that a patient has been prevented from discovering misconduct on the part of a
health care provider because that health care provider has affirmatively acted to
fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct.” Utah Code § 78B-3-404(2)(b) (emphasis
added). The statute’s reference to “acts” that are “affirmative” and that “prevent”
discovery leave Tapp no room to argue that silence by Intermountain or a mere “decision
not to expose known misconduct” (Br. 32) satisfies the exception. Tapp never explains
how silence, even in the face of a duty, can constitute an “affirmative act” that “prevents”
the discovery of misconduct. Inherent in the statute’s words is the reality that only a
18

fraudulent interaction with a patient can satisfy the exception; and Plaintiff alleges
nothing of the sort against Intermountain. T.R.753–54.
Additionally, the UHMA’s reference to “fraudulent concealment” in other
contexts further demonstrates that silence is never enough. Regarding consents, the
UHMA states that a consent is void when a plaintiff shows “that the execution of a
written consent was induced by the defendant’s affirmative acts of fraudulent
misrepresentation or fraudulent omission to state material facts.” See Utah Code § 78B3-406(4) (emphasis added). This Court considers statutes “as a whole” and “in harmony
with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters.” State v. Barrett, 2005 UT
88, ¶ 29, 127 P.3d 682. Section 78B-3-404(2)(b)’s absence of statutory language
regarding “fraudulent omissions” as later used in section 78B-3-406(4) is “purposeful,”
and must be given effect. See Marion Energy, Inc., 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14. Accordingly, the
district court correctly held that “affirmative[] act[s]” means what it says and does not
encompass silence.
2.

Intermountain’s Interpretation Is Consistent with Utah Cases.

No Utah appellate court has ever revived an untimely claim under § 78B-3404(2)(b) where the plaintiff alleged silence as the basis for “fraudulent concealment.” In
Chapman, the plaintiffs’ claims against Dr. Veasy survived because plaintiffs alleged
they “consulted Dr. Veasy,” who “told them [falsely] that tests had been performed
which showed that Jennifer’s injuries had resulted from a blood clot … unrelated to
anyone’s negligence.” 784 P.2d at 1183.

19

In Roth, the Court of Appeals, relying upon Chapman, rejected the silence
argument Tapp now makes, holding that “Roth neither avers that he ever consulted with
[his physician] about the May 2004 resection surgery nor alleges that [the physician] ever
provided Roth with information that misrepresented or concealed his involvement in the
surgery.” 2009 UT App 313, *3. The Court of Appeals reached this conclusion “[e]ven
assuming that a fiduciary duty to reveal this information existed.” Id.
Though common law fraudulent concealment doctrine has no direct application,
this Court’s previous decisions are nonetheless instructive. As Tapp concedes, “[t]o
obtain the benefit of the equitable discovery rule [including fraudulent concealment], a
plaintiff must have been diligent in discovering her claim.” Br. 28 (citing Russell
Packard Dev., Inc., 2005 UT 14, ¶ 25–26). Thus, under the common law, a plaintiff does
not get to the starting line of proving “tolling” unless she alleges that she “actually made
an attempt to investigate [her] claim and … such an attempt must have been rendered
futile as a result of the defendant’s fraudulent or misleading conduct.” Colosimo v.
Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 2007 UT 25, ¶¶ 40, 44, 156 P.3d 806. Tapp
alleges she saw “lawyer advertising,” T.R.145, not that she conducted a “diligent
investigation.”
The logical extension of this principle is that “[i]n no case … is mere silence or
failure to disclose sufficient in itself to constitute fraudulent concealment.” Colosimo,
2007 UT 25, ¶ 44 (quoting Helleloid v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 361, 149 F. Supp. 2d 863,
869 (D. Minn. 2001)); Ramsay v. Ret. Bd., 2017 UT App 17, ¶ 15, 391 P.3d 1069
(dismissing untimely claims based on Colosimo). Section 78B-3-404(2)(b) simply
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codifies this established common law principle. And because Tapp has alleged nothing
but silence by Intermountain, and no allegation that she diligently inquired during the
repose period, she simply provides “no factual basis” for fraudulent concealment.
Colosimo, 2007 UT 25, ¶ 43.
3.

Under Duty Analysis Hospitals Can’t Interfere with Physicians’ Care.

Even if this Court were to take Tapp’s expansive interpretation of § 78B-3404(2)(b) as correct (which it should not), Tapp still—as a matter of law—cannot avoid
the repose statute as to claims against Intermountain. Tapp contends that “[a]ctual
knowledge (not imputed knowledge) of the misconduct requires one to decide whether to
disclose it, an affirmative act.” Br. 32. In other words, knowledge of misconduct
imposes a “duty to communicate that information to their patients.” Id. Among other
flaws, this argument disregards the distinction between the duties of treating physicians
and medical facilities as recognized in law. It also ignores that hospitals do not create or
access the treating physician’s treatment records.
While this Court has not directly addressed whether hospitals owe patients a duty
to disclose patient-specific information,10 in Buu Nguyen v. IHC Med. Servs., Inc., 2012
UT App 288, ¶ 11, 288 P.3d 1084, the Court of Appeals addressed a hospital’s duties of
disclosure in the context of informed consent. The court held, “consistent with the

10

Tapp implies that this Court has imposed such a duty, citing Sorensen v. Barbuto, 2008
UT 8, ¶ 15, 177 P.3d 614. Br. 32. Barbuto relates to a treating physician’s (not a
hospital’s) “fiduciary duty” of confidentiality under Utah R. Evid. 506 during litigation.
See 2008 UT 8, ¶¶ 11–25. It says nothing of a physician’s or hospital’s “duty to disclose”
alleged malpractice.
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overwhelming weight of precedent from other states,” that “absent any special
circumstances, a hospital does not generally owe an independent duty to obtain a
patient’s informed consent to treatment.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing cases).11
Outside of Utah, in analogous circumstances, the rule is the same. For example, in
Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. Hiland, 547 N.E.2d 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), adopted by Cacdac
v. Hiland, 561 N.E.2d 758 (Ind. 1990), the court addressed whether a hospital has a duty
to disclose that a physician fraudulently induced plaintiffs to have an unnecessary disc
removal surgery “for the sole purpose of benefitting [him] financially.” Id. at 871. The
court dismissed the claims against the hospital, holding that the statute of limitations was
not tolled under a fraudulent concealment theory because “there existed no duty on the
part of the hospital to disclose any information to [plaintiffs].” Id. at 876. The court
added that even if a duty existed, the duty would end—and thus tolling would end—once
the plaintiff was discharged. Id. at 873. In Walker v. Sonora Reg’l Med. Ctr., 202 Cal.
App. 4th 948 (2012), the court held that “[w]e do not think it wise to impose upon [the]
Hospital the duty to advise a patient or a patient’s parents concerning the patient’s
condition when that duty might substantially interfere with the relationship between the

11

“Special circumstances” existed in Nguyen because the hospital failed to obtain
informed consent to use a sales demo ventilator unit the hospital tested. This unit had
not been tested on patients and “was not a standard piece of equipment that a treating
physician might or might not have chosen to use, in her discretion.” 2012 UT App 288, ¶
12. It was only because of these unique facts that the special circumstances imposing a
duty existed.
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patient and her attending physician.” Id. at 963 (quoting Derrick v. Ontario Cmty.
Hosp. 47 Cal. App. 3d 145 (1975)).12
Thus, under Nguyen and other authority, Plaintiff’s allegations fail as a matter of
law for the additional reason that Intermountain did not have a legal duty to notify Tapp
that Dr. Sorensen had allegedly performed “a large number of unnecessary” procedures
on other patients.13
Additionally, as Tapp correctly states, this Court resolves statutory ambiguities in
a way that avoids absurd consequences. See Br. 34 (citing Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48,
¶ 27, 387 P.3d 1000). Section 78B-3-404(2)(b) is unambiguous but if this Court
disagrees, it should reject Tapp’s proffered interpretation because it would effectively
eliminate the statute of repose—an absurd outcome. Under Tapp’s interpretation,
medical malpractice would be “affirmatively fraudulently concealed” every time a
plaintiff is not expressly told of malpractice. Under this theory, even when a hospital
only thinks the physician could have breached a medical standard—which is rarely

12

Brown v. Trover, 2016 WL 100311 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2016), similarly addresses
malpractice and fraud claims regarding a radiologist’s alleged carelessness in reading
reports. The plaintiffs alleged the facility “failed to disclose that staff at the [facility] had
expressed concerns to the administration regarding [the radiologist’s] substandard
medical practices.” Id. at *13. The court concluded that “[w]hatever duty [plaintiff]
might imagine in this regard would be unworkable. The likely result of recognizing such
a duty—i.e., a duty to inform patients of unproven complaints against doctors—is to
create more liability than it avoids.” Id.
13
Tapp does not allege that Intermountain was aware that her PFO closure was
unnecessary. Tapp only alleges that the “sheer volume” of procedures “provided the
hospitals knowledge that he was performing them [unnecessarily].” Br. 8.
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clear—the hospital’s failure to “disclose the misconduct” (Br. 1) constitutes “affirmative”
fraudulent concealment and thus eviscerates the statute of repose.
Such a duty not only imposes an unworkable burden on hospitals, it also
contravenes the UHMA’s core purposes of “limiting [the] time [to assert malpractice] to
a specific period,” and reining in professional liability premiums. Utah Code § 78B-3402(3). Intermountain accordingly requests that this Court reject Tapp’s unprecedented
expansion of § 78B-3-404(2)(b)’s narrow statutory exception.
II.

THE FOREIGN OBJECT EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY.
In another challenge Tapp lost below but failed to appeal, she asks this Court for a

judicial expansion of the “foreign object” exception in § 78B-3-404(2)(a). Tapp’s
argument is procedurally foreclosed (Coble, 2010 UT App 98, ¶ 10), but in all events
disregards the statute’s plain language.
The exception provides that when “a foreign object has been wrongfully left
within a patient’s body,” the patient has one year to bring suit from when the patient
discovers “the existence of the foreign object wrongfully left in the patient’s body.” Utah
Code § 78B-3-404(2)(a) (emphasis added)). The district court correctly held that this
exception is inapplicable because the PFO device “was the precise device that was
contemplated for the surgery” and “the patient knew all along that a device had been
placed in her body.” T.R.750. Thus, the device is neither a “foreign object,” nor was it
“wrongfully left in the patient’s body” such that Tapp only later “discovered [its]
existence.” Utah Code § 78B-3-404(2)(a) (emphasis added); see also LaBarbera v. N.Y.
Eye and Ear Infirmary, 691 N.E.2d 617, 621 (N.Y. Ct. of Appeals 1998) (“Thus, [a stent
24

intentionally placed] may be an ‘object,’ but it is not ‘foreign’ and not ‘left behind,’ in
any medical or legal senses.”).
Tapp largely ignores the statutory language and argues, based on a 1968 case, that
“a medical malpractice claim cannot expire until the patient learns that a foreign object
was left in her body, and that leaving that object in the body gives rise to a ‘right of
action.’” Br. 19 (citing Christiansen v. Rees, 436 P.2d 435, 436 (Utah 1968)).
Christiansen does not stand for this proposition. It holds that “where a foreign object is
negligently left in the patient’s body during an operation and the patient is ignorant of
the fact, and consequently of his right of action for malpractice, the cause of action does
not accrue until the patient learned of the presence of such foreign object in his body.”
436 P.2d at 436 (emphasis added). The Court’s holding was not that “ignorance” of a
patient’s “right of action” is sufficient.
Tapp also relies on out-of-state cases in an attempt to extend the UHMA’s
exception. Those cases either do not stand for the proposition Tapp cites them for, or
they involve materially different statutory language. Critically, each court construed a
“foreign object” exception according to plain language, unlike Tapp’s argument.14

14

In Chambers v. Semmer, 197 S.W.3d 730 (Tenn. 2006), the court determined that a
hemoclip device that was intentionally placed into the patient’s body, but “negligently
left” there following surgery, was a “foreign object.” Id. at 737. In contrast, the PFO
device was both intentionally placed and intentionally left in place. In Norred v. Teaver,
740 S.E.2d 251 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013), the involved statute provided that “an action shall be
brought within one year after the negligent or wrongful act or omission is discovered.”
Id. at 252 (quoting Ga. Code Ann. § 9-3-72 (emphasis added)). Norred supports the
district court’s interpretation of § 78B-3-404(2)(a) because the statute’s trigger is
discovery of the foreign object’s “existence,” not the alleged “negligent or wrongful act.”
In Beatman v. Gates, 521 N.E.2d 521 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987), the court addressed whether
25

In sum, Tapp’s attempt to apply the foreign object exception to her claims fails for
the reasons stated by the district court, and should be rejected if allowed to be raised on
appeal.
CONCLUSION
Intermountain respectfully requests that the Court reverse the district court’s
failure to apply Rule 9(c) to allegations against Intermountain and dismiss Tapp’s
remaining claims against Intermountain with prejudice.
DATED this 7th day of June, 2019.
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the plaintiff’s IUD was a “foreign object,” which the court found it was only because it
had migrated from its original location. Id. at 523.
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